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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTA..~ 
THE STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff-Respondent 
vs. 
MICHAEL GEORGE DURRANT, 
Defendant-Appellant 
Case No. 18051 
BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
STATEMENT OF THE NATURE OF THE CASE 
The appellant, MICHAEL GEORGE DURANT, appeals from the 
conviction and judgment of Aggravated Arson, a felony in the 
Second Degree, in the Third Judicial District Court, in and for 
Salt Lake County, State of Utah, the Honorable Peter F. Leary, 
presiding. 
DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT 
The appellant, MICHAEL GEORGE DURANT, was tried and 
convicted of Aggravated Arson, a Second Degree felony. Appellant 
was sentence to an indeterminate term not to exceed five years 
pursuant to §76-3-402 Utah Code Annotated (1953 as amended) 
wherein the judge lowered the penalty to the next lower category 
and imposed sentence accordingly. 
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RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Appellant seeks reversal of the judgment rendered by 
the Court below and a new trial. 
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS 
On December 1, 1980, at approximately 1:50 a.m. the 
house where the appellant and the owner resided was set on fire. 
The fire was allegedly caused by a liquid-pour accellerant 
(T. 5, L.16-18). Bullet holes were found in the kitchen walls. 
Bullet casings and fragments were also found (T. 7, L.21-25); 
8, L.1-6). Appellant gave the police a statement later that 
morning, and also another one on June 5, 1981. In the first 
statement, appellant said he and Rose (the owner) had been out 
drinking earlier that evening of November 30, and that Rose's 
car broke down. They came home, then left to return to the car, 
then spent the entire evening with a friend in West Valley (T. 27, 
L.20-25; 28, L.1-2). 
Miss Martin, the witness who lived next door, said that 
she saw appellant and Rose together in the house the night of 
November 30 when the shots were fired (T. 18, L.1-7). Then Rose 
left a few minutes before the fire started (T. 18, L.10-11; 24, 
L.2-5). After the fire started, Miss Martin said she saw 
appellant leaving the scene (T. 18, L.15-25). She said both 
appellant and Rose returned the next morning asking what had 
happened (T. 21, L.23-24). 
-2-
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After appellant was arrested on June 5, 1981, he gave a 
statement (STate's Exhibit 8-P), which differed from his prior 
one (T. 28, L.6-8). In that statement, appellant admitted that 
he started the fire but was acting under the directions of Rose, 
the owner. 
Counsel made a motion to dismiss at the end of the State's 
case. The motion was based on the argument that defendant did not 
act "unlawfully" nor commit aggravated arson in setting the fire, 
using Christendon (infra) as authority. The motion was denied. 
Appellant was found guilty of Aggravated Arson as charged. 
That crime normally carries a penalty of one to fifteen years, 
but at sentencing, Judge Leary decided to reduce the penalty in 
appellant's case to zero to five years. §76-3-402 Utah Code 
Annotated (1953 as amended), reads: 
76-3-402. Conviction of lower category of 
offense.--(1) If the court, having regard 
to the nature and circumstances of the 
offense of which the defendant was found 
guilty and to the history and character of 
the defendant, concludes that it would be 
unduly harsh to record the conviction as 
being for that category of offense establish-
ed by statute and to sentence the defendant 
to an alternative normally applicable to 
that offense, the court may enter a judg-
ment of conviction for the next lower 
category of offense and impose sentence 
accordingly. 
In his judgment, Judge Leary recorded the conviction as 
"Aggravated Arson, a Third Degree felony," meaning he decided the 
charge was appropriate, but that the normal penalty would be 
unduly harsh. He sentenced appellant according to the next lower 
-3-
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category resulting in appellant's zero to five years sentence. 
This sentencing procedure does not affect the substance 
of appellant's argument wherein it is contended that he should 
not have been found guilty of Aggravated Arson initially. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
APPELLANT SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN CONVICTED OF THE 
CRIME OF AGGRAVATED ARSON SINCE HE DID NOT 
"UNLAWFULLY" BURN A HATITABLE STRUCTURE. 
The following statutes are relevant to a determination of 
the appellant's criminal culpability in this case: 
76-6-104. Reckless burning.--(1) A person 
is guilty of reckless burning if he: 
(a) Recklessly starts a fire or causes 
an explosion which endangers human life; or 
(b) Having started a fire, whether 
recklessly or not, and knowing that it is spread-
ing and will endanger the life or property of 
another, either fails to take reasonable measures 
to put out or control the fire or fails to give 
a prompt fire alarm; or 
(c) Damages the property of another by 
reckless use of fire or causing an explosion. 
76-6-102. Arson.--(1) A person is guilty of 
arson, if under circumstances not amounting 
to aggravated arson, by means of fire or 
explosives, he unlawfully and intentionally 
damages: 
(a) Any property with intention of 
defrauding an insurer; or 
(b) The property of another. 
76-6-102. Aggravated arson.--[(l)] A person 
is guilty of aggravated arson if by means of 
-4-
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fire or explosives he intentionally and un-
lawfully damages: 
(a) A habitable structure; or 
(b) Any structure or vehLcle when any 
person not a participant in the offense is 
in the structure or vehicle. 
(Utah Code Ann. 1953 as amended) 
Appellant asserts that while his conduct may be proscribed 
by the provisions of §76-6-104 and §76-6-102, it does not fall 
within the provisions of §76-6-103, and he is therefore not guilty 
of aggravated arson. 
A traditional principle of law is that it is not "unlawful" 
for an owner to destroy his own property by burning it. See 17 
ALR 1168. At common law, an owner had autonomy over his own 
property and could dispose of it, or destroy it, as he so desired. 
This principle remains in tact, except insofar as the legislature 
has modified it. The legislature has created three distinct 
offenses which proscribe the act of burning and destroying property. 
One of these offenses, "reckless burning," conspicuoulsy 
omits the word "unlawful," and seeks to punish even those who 
choose :to destroy their own property. The "reckless burning" 
statute is offended if one recklessly starts a fire which endangers 
human life, or endangers or damages the property of another. The 
obvious intent of the legislature is to protect the person and 
property of others that may be nearby the fire, regardless of any 
justification that may exist for the burning itself. 
-5-
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Thus, even though an individual burns down his own property 
in an exercise of autonomy, he is guilty of reckless burning 
if there is a danger of the fire spreading to adjoining property 
or harming people nearby. Appellant's conduct, even though 
he was acting at the direction of the owner of the property, 
and thus burning "his own" property, is clearly sanctioned 
by the "reckless burning" statute. 
The "arson" statute, on the other hand, clearly incorporates 
the common law notion by using the word "unlawful". The legislature 
has specifically defined the unlawful conduct; a person may 
not burn any property with the intent of defrauding an insurer, 
nor may an individual burn the property of another, under circumstances 
not amounting to aggravated arson. In this case, Rose could 
be found guilty of arson if it is shown that his intent in 
procuring appellant to burn the property was to defraud an 
insurer. (References to that effect are found in Plaintiff's 
Exhibit 8-P) Appellant, of course, would also commit the fraud 
if he knew the owner's intent. He could not, however, be convicted 
under subsection (b) (destroying the property of another) where 
he had permission from the owner. 
The "aggravated arson" statute also incorporates the 
word "unlawful" in its language. Aggravated arson is "arson" 
plus two specifically defined aggravations. Under subsection 
(a) if an individual commits "arson" (burns any property to 
defraud an insurer, or burns the property of another), and 
that property is habitable, the offense becomes aggravated. 
The common law notion that an individual may destroy his own 
property, as long as he doesn't endanger 
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victims, remains intact. Under subsection (b), however, the 
legislature creates an aggravation that occurs when any property 
is damaged. The common law notion is thus modified where a 
victim is inside the structure. 
The policy behind the aggravated arson statute is not 
abrogated by incorporating the interpretation of "unlawful" 
into its provisions as that word is illuminated by the arson 
statute. Under subsection (a), the aggravated arson statute 
addresses itself to other people's habitable structures, like 
hotels, warehouses, offices, and homes. 
On the other hand, under subsection (b) a person can 
be guilty of the offense if he or she damages by fire or explosives 
any structure or vehicle when a person is inside. Thus, where 
an individual may be harmed within the structure, ownership 
of the structure is irrelevant. The statute is obviously worded 
and sensibly interpreted to apply to another's property under 
subsection (a) and any property under subsection (b). 
Appellant, therefore, cannot be guilty of aggravated 
arson. The circumstances surrounding the incident indicate 
complicity between appellant, the actor, and Rose, the owner. 
Appellant was procured by Rose, the owner, to burn the house. 
The relationship is one of agent/principal or principal and 
accomplice. The focus must necessarily shift to the owner 
because the agent cannot be any more responsible than the principal, 
where the agent is merely following the principal's directives. 
-7-
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
 Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
A case directly on point and supportive of appellant's 
position is State v. Christendon, 468 P.2d 153 (Kansas 1970). 
In that case, the defendant applied the torch to the owner's 
property (a hotel) at the owner's request. The owner had procured 
the defendant to do the deed. There, the owner was found guilty 
of "insurance arson" a third degree felony, but could not be 
found guilty of first degree arson of the building. The court 
said a necessary element of first degree arson (comparable 
to Utah's 76-6-103) is that "the building burned be the property 
of another person", id at 155. The cases dealing with the 
owner's culpability were State v. Parrish, 468 P.2d 143 (Kansas 
1970), and State v. Parrish, 468 P.2d 150 (Kansas 1970). 
In Christendon, the defendant could not be found guilty 
of first degree arson and his conviction on that charge was 
reversed. The court explained that the defendant "could not 
be guilty of a more serious crime than the owner who hired 
him," 468 P.2d at 154. The Parrish cases established that 
the owner intended to defraud or injure an insurer. The evidence 
showed that the defendant expected renumeration for his deed. 
The Christendon court referred to the annotation in 
54 A.L.R. p. 1236 which commented on State v. Craig, 259 P.2d 
802 (Kansas 1927). The court said that: 
... in a number of other cases, the courts have 
discussed the criminal liability of one who burns 
a building with the sanction of the owner at the 
times of the burning, and have held that such a 
person is not guilty of arson, since, at common 
law and under most statutes, one cannot be criminally 
liable for burning his own building, and an agent 
cannot be more liable than his principal would 
be if he did the act. [citing cases] 
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As to the culpability of the agent, the court referred 
to 5 Am. Jur. 2d, Arson and Related Offenses, §23, p. 818: 
If the owner in possession is not guilty of arson 
in burning his own property, then one who assists 
the owner in burning it or who burns it at the 
owner's request is not guilty of arson, for the 
agent's guilt can only be coextensive with that 
of the principal. 
In holding the agent's guilt to be coextensive with 
the owner's, the Ohio Supreme Court in Haas v. State, 132 N.E. 
158 (1921) said: 
It is but the application of ordinary logic to 
say that if the aider and abettor is guilty of 
the same crime as the principal, and may be prosecuted 
as a principal, that the principal is guilty of 
the same crime as the aider and abettor; that in 
law the action of the one is treated as the action 
of both, and that the actions of both are no different 
than though the separate acts of each were performed 
by one person. * * * (132 N.E. at 159) 
The Christendo.n Court summed up its position by stating 
that under statutes similar to its first degree arson statute, 
the cases were quite uniform in holding that an agent who burns 
the owner's building at the request of the owner cannot be 
held guilty of burning the property of another. It cited these 
cases: [Haas v. State, supra; Commonwealth v. Makely, 131 
Mass. 421 (1881); State v. Haynes, 66 Me. 307 (1876); Roberts 
v. The Sate, 7 Cold. (42 Tenn) 359 (1870); Heard v. State, 
81 Ala. 55, 1 So. 640 (1887); Dedieu v. The People, 22 N.Y. 
[Appeals] 178 (1860); State v. Sarvis, 45 S.C. 668, 24 S.E. 
53 (1896); State v. Greer, 243 Mo. 599, 147 S.W. 968 (1912). 
See also Wharton's Criminal Law and Procedure [Anderson] Vol. 
II, Arson §405, p.20 The court went on to say that: 
-9-
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Although the relationship of principal and agent 
is not technically applicable to criminal law, 
yet responsibility for burning property generally 
depends upon the intent or mens rea of the owner 
who procures the burning. If the owner desires 
to rid himself of a building by burning and can 
limit the fire to his own building he may do so. 
Without a willful or malicious intent he commits 
no crime. An owner can hire someone to do to his 
property what he himself may do. The person hired 
to burn the property of the owner commits no greater 
crime than the owner. 
The reasoning which limits the guilt of the agent 
arises out of the law of principals and accessories. 
The person who applies the torch to the property 
is the principal. The person who procures, counsels 
and aids the principal to burn the property is 
the accessory. In theory the accessory (owner) 
is regarded as constructively present, giving aid, 
counsel and encouragement to successfully accomplish 
the common purpose. The separate acts of the accessory 
(the owner) and of the principal (the torch) unite 
in one purpose. (See Perkins on Criminal Law [University 
Textbook Series], Parties to Crime, p. 572). The 
purpose in this case, which makes the burning criminal 
in nature is the owner's intent to defraud the 
insurer by burning the property. If the defendant 
knew he was assisting the owner in defrauding the 
insurer when he set fire to the owner's property 
he too was guilty of accomplishing the crime proscribed 
by Kansas' Third Degree Arson Statute. Bur in 
any event the purpose accomplished by both accessory 
and principal remains the same. The purpose was 
not to burn the property of another person. 
Thus, the reasoning of the controlling authorities support 
appellant's position that his actions as "the torch" can be 
no more culpable than those of Rose, the owner. Here, the 
evidence shows that appellant acted at the request of and under 
the direction of Rose. 
The neighbor testified that Rose and appellant were 
both in the house when the shots were fired at about 12:30 
a.m. on December 1. (T. 18, L.1-8). The neighbor also said 
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Rose left the house just before it was set ablaze (T. 18, L.10-
11). If the fire started at 1:50 a.m. as testified to, then 
Rose remained inside for more than one hour after the shots. 
Soon after Rose left, the fire started and appellant was seen 
leaving the area (T. 18, L.15-25). Later that morning, both 
Rose and appellant returned to the scene. 
In his June 5 statement, appellant said that Rose would 
pay him $1,000 if he would participate in setting the house 
on fire. In preparing to set the fire, appellant said Rose 
first secured his personal papers, titles etc., and his gun, 
and then told appellant where (what area of the house) to dump 
the laquer thinner. After this was done, Rose left in the car 
and appellant immediately started the fire as per Rose's instructions. 
He then ran out to meet Rose who was waiting for him in fro.nt 
of a shack a short distance away from the burning house. Then 
they both "took off" in the car. Appellant explained "how 
Rose set up their alibi with Fred Butler in West Valley." He 
also stated that he was never paid for helping Rose burn his 
house down. 
CONCLUSION 
Appellant's conviction of aggravated arson cannot stand. 
His culpability can be no greater than that of the owner, Rose. 
Under the aggravated arson statute, a defendant cannot be guilty 
of destroying his own property unless an innocent person was 
inside the structure. Since no victims were involved, and 
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the burning was not of the habitable structure of another, 
appellant's conviction must be reversed. 
DATED this ..--z__ day of September, 1982. 
7 
."- -~ ,; /' 
/ l~~ / k--c_j( (7 NANCY BE \ ~ 
Attorney for App llant \ 
_) 
DELIVERED a copy of the foregoing to the Attorney General's 
Office, 236 State Capitol Building, Salt Lake City, Utah 84114, 
this ~~day of September, 1982. 
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